Introduction: Phenomena That Take Time to Be Seen
Throughout the history of human thought and social experience, there have been many phenomena that existed for long periods without being named, clearly identified, or framed within an independent discourse. As long as such phenomena remain confined to the mind of a single observer, they hover in a gray zone between “private imagination” and “debatable reality.” But once they become generalizable, repeatable, and objectively observable, they gradually make their way into public conversation, intellectual circles, and even academic literature.
So-called awkward moments in social life are simpler examples of this process: uncomfortable, misaligned, often distressing situations that nearly all of us have experienced. While coping skills for dealing with such moments are important, they are not the subject of this essay. What concerns us here is a final, far more complex—and considerably more bitter—version of this awkwardness: a phenomenon that unfolds not at the individual level, but on the stage of international politics.
Defining a Concept: What Is Ultimate Awkwardness?
I propose a specific name for this phenomenon: Ultimate Awkwardness.
In simple terms, it refers to a moment in international relations when one state defends a neighboring state not because of that neighbor’s positive performance, but precisely because the neighbor’s regime is deeply weak, inefficient, and inhibiting—so much so that its very survival makes the supporter’s own path to development easier.
This situation becomes “ultimate” when the poorly performing state, consciously or unconsciously, comes close to recognizing that the support it receives is not rooted in shared values, but in structural exploitation. At this point, the ruling system encounters a profound psychological and cognitive rift. Accepting this reality is extremely costly, so denial often takes its place. That denial reproduces itself in a familiar claim: “We must be doing so well that others are forced to defend us.”
In many ways, this is even more tragic than openly knowing one is being supported because of weakness; it amounts to a form of compounded ignorance.
Is This a New Phenomenon?
Probably not. Traces of it can be found throughout the history of neighborly relations, temporary alliances, and short-term strategic calculations. What makes the phenomenon especially visible today is its intensity, clarity, and nakedness—particularly in a world where benchmarks of development, power, and legitimacy are more transparent than ever.
In my view, the most striking manifestation of Ultimate Awkwardness occurred in January 2026, when the Islamic Republic of Iran was at its weakest structural point, with the shadow of a deeply asymmetrical conflict looming overhead. At that moment, several regional countries—states that had spent years portraying Iran as their primary threat—suddenly mobilized to ensure the survival of that very weak regime, largely through coordination with the United States.
These were the same countries that had previously used Iran’s presence as justification for acquiring the most advanced defensive systems. This abrupt reversal cannot be understood without addressing a fundamental question: why?
The Key Question: Has the Islamic Republic Really “Performed Poorly”?
To understand this contradictory behavior, we must first answer a basic question:
Has the Islamic Republic performed badly enough to qualify as a case of Ultimate Awkwardness?
Answering this requires examining both the author’s and the reader’s assumptions. At a minimum, the assessment must consider three axes: time, resources, and outcomes.
Time and Resources: How Political Systems Are Judged
In accounting and performance evaluation, both the time frame and the point of assessment matter. Governance is no different. If we take roughly half a century as the evaluation window for a political system, we are working with a reasonable benchmark. But time alone is not sufficient; available resources are the other decisive factor.
The question is straightforward:
Given the resources at its disposal, what has this system achieved over that period? And more importantly, what could it have achieved?
In terms of natural resources, energy reserves, geographic position, and human capital, Iran ranks among the world’s most advantaged countries. This is so self-evident that it hardly requires extensive proof. The key point is that this advantage is not limited to one or two sectors; it represents a broad portfolio of assets, each of which could have served as a driver of sustainable development.
Revolution, Developmental Arrest, and the Reproduction of Backwardness
If a political system fails to deliver tangible results within one or two years, this might be attributed to transitional conditions. But when, over a time span that allows for rational planning and execution of a development path, such a path is never realized, the problem takes on a different nature altogether.
The 1979 revolution occurred at a moment when Iran was moving rapidly along a development trajectory. Society entered a game in which its own role in the broader equation was marginal. The bitter irony is that the same governing actors who halted that trajectory are now witnessing extensive lobbying and expenditures aimed at keeping that very country underdeveloped.
With approximately 47 to 48 years of governance behind it, there is ample time to evaluate performance—especially if economic and social development indicators are used as the benchmark.
Welfare, the Middle Class, and the Failure of a Project
For the author now in his third decade of life, complete neutrality on this issue is impossible. From this vantage point, the most meaningful indicator of development is citizen welfare—or, more precisely, the existence of a broad middle class with incomes that make sense at both regional and global scales, given the country’s resources.
For years, neighboring states, in coordination with the United States, framed Iran as their principal threat. Even in American strategic literature, including the work of Brandon J. Weichert, there is an emphasis on shifting from direct confrontation toward empowering regional allies. The contradiction emerges when those very allies, at the Islamic Republic’s most vulnerable moment, not only refrained from welcoming its collapse but actively worked to preserve it.
Supporting a regime that, in a short span, has left tens of thousands dead, hundreds of thousands injured, and continues to engage in systematic repression can no longer be justified through classical security concepts alone. It is here that Ultimate Awkwardness reveals itself as a distinct phenomenon—one that even forces the United States to seriously reconsider the level and quality of its cooperation with its regional partners.